No one would accuse last season's Atlanta United 2 side of being particularly strong on the defensive end, but their approach against opposing attacks was marked by a very specific style. Though they ended the year by giving up three or more goals in seven of their last sixteen games (44%; 1.9 goals allowed per game), this team started the reason rather brightly and was always a tough out. Under coach Jack Collison and likely influenced by the first team's front office, Atlanta employed an aggressive pressing scheme out of a loose 4-2-3-1 or 4-1-4-1 shape.
The data bears out United's philosophy. By passes allowed per defensive action (PPDA), a stat which measures the number of passes a team allows in their own half per defensive action (think of a tackle or interception here). In other words, a team with a low PPDA does not allow their opponent to complete many passes without intervening. Atlanta's PPDA was 8.2, good for fourth in the league or the 90th percentile. Stemming from this penchant for hard closing and ball-winning, the side also ranked second in the USL for possession.
Let's dig into the video now. In this first clip, the central trio for Atlanta pinches tight into the middle, cutting off the heart of the pitch. One holding midfielder supports two more advanced pressers. Meanwhile, forward-line interchange sees the one attacker apply back-pressure as he collapses in the direction of that midfield trio. The goal here is to deny access to the most dangerous part of the pitch and maybe even create a turnover.
Wing play was an important variable within that pressing structure as well. At first, you can see how the winger on the ball side plays higher as his peer on the opposite flank sits deeper. This hedges against a switch over the top. Memphis can't advance, and Atlanta's left back jumps up to heighten the pressure; his advance is countered by one central midfielder dropping a shade deeper. Here, you're seeing how Atlanta's system bent and flexed to assure solidity while still prioritizing aggression.
Another example, seen below, bears out this principle. Two central midfielders and the right back push up in this instance, but the striker sits back. Additionally, the holder and left wing sit very deep near their base positions further away from the ball. The give-and-take is plain to see yet again.
Indeed, the pressure applied by Collison's side wasn't always operating at full intensity. When a team got past that initial wave of pressure, Atlanta was more than willing to sit back in their own block and form into a typical 4-2-3-1 shape to cut off passing lanes in a more passive manner. Just look at the space afforded to Memphis' ball-carrying defender here; there's clearly a change in focus when the ball hits the halfway line.
At its best, the Atlanta system not only denied opposing attacks but also created offense as a knock-on effect. Here, an errant long ball could go unpursued, but Atlanta instead chooses to counterpress with intensity. A striker and a three-man attacking line close hard as the opponent tries to shepherd the ball, leading to an errant backpass and a penalty for United. It's a classic case of turning defense into offense. An effective press blurs the line between the two phases when the system is clicking.
I noted from the top that Atlanta didn't have a particularly stout defense, and that's certainly important to remember. This was a young side with a lot of roster churn throughout the year, and maintaining a strong and organized pressing setup was always going to be a tall task. As a result, you often saw this team concede sloppy breaks; there's a reason they comfortably missed the playoffs. Still, the efficacy and viability of a hard-closing, high-pressure defensive scheme at the USL level are clear to see.
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